By HOUSTON PUTNAM LOWRY (fn*) AND PETER W. SCHROTH (fn**)
After several years of frenzied activity, the pace of Connecticut legislation
in the international area has slowed. This leaves the Bar an opportunity to
become familiar with the newly enacted body of legislation, codified principally
in Title 50a of the General Statutes. Part I of this article is a summary of the
1987 to 1991 legislation and its codification. Part 11 is a discussion of the
Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act, adopted in Connecticut in
1992. Part III is a description of the United Nations International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States became a party in 1992.
Part IV is a discussion of recent Connecticut decisions on the application of
the Uniform Foreign Money-judgments Recognition Act. (fn1)
I. CODIFICATION OF 1987-1991 LEGISLATION
Title 50a was added to the General Statutes for "international" laws and several of the recent statutes have been codified under that title. However, other recent laws relating to international matters are codified in Titles 33, 51 and 52.
Title 50a now comprises five statutes, some of which have been renumbered:
1. International Wills, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 50a-1-50a-9 (formerly §§ 45-194a-45-194i). This is the Uniform International Wills Act, adopted in
Connecticut in 1987. (fn2)
2. Uniform Foreign Money-judgments Recognition Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 50a-30-50a-38 (formerly §§ 52-610-52-618), adopted in Connecticut in 1988. (fn3)
3. Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 50a-50-50a-65, adopted in Connecticut in 1989. (fn4)
4. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 50a-100-50a-136, adopted in Connecticut in 1989
and amended in 1991. (fn5)
5. Conflict of Jurisdictions Model Law, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 50a-200-50a-203, adopted in Connecticut in 1991. (fn6)
The Act Concerning International Obligations and Procedures, P.A. 91-324,
(fn7) has been codified as follows:
P.A. Section CONN. GEN. STAT. Subject 1 §52-59d Service of process abroad. 2 §52-197b Taking of evidence abroad. 3 §51-88 Arbitration agents not engaged in unauthorized practice of law. 4 § 51-80a Foreign legal consultants. 5-8 §§33-182a, 33-182c, Foreign shareholders of 33-182g, 33-182k Connecticut professional corporations. 9 §50a-101(2) Amendment of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 10-13 §§50a-200, 50a-201, Conflict of Jurisdictions 50a-202, 50a-203. Model Law. 14 §52-156a Deposition to perpetuate testimony.
II. UNIFORM TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION RECIPROCAL ACCESS ACT
On May 19, 1992, Connecticut enacted the Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act, which was proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1982. (fn8) The act came into force on October 1,1992.
In 1979, the American Bar Association and the Canadian Bar Association adopted a report prepared by a joint committee entitled "The Settlement of International Disputes Between Canada and the United States of America." One of the major areas of concern was pollution. The damage pollution causes does not respect national boundaries. The primary legal problems are caused by the fact the polluter is usually outside the jurisdiction where the
polluter causes damage.
Under common law, actions for damages concerning land could be brought only where the land was situated. This means a person whose Connecticut land suffered pollution damage could sue only in Connecticut. If the polluter was outside of Connecticut, the Connecticut plaintiff had to rely on the Connecticut "long arm" statute to obtain jurisdiction over the polluter. (fn9)
The long arm statute does not provide jurisdiction if the pollution is an isolated event and the polluter has no other contacts with Connecticut. Under such circumstances, the due process clause of the United States Constitution may prohibit Connecticut from exercising jurisdiction. (fn10) In such cases, a Connecticut plaintiff could pursue a polluter only in the polluter's home jurisdiction. If the polluter's home jurisdiction is common-law based, however, it may refuse to hear the case because the land is in Connecticut and the damage was suffered in Connecticut.
Furthermore, Canadian courts are not required to give full faith and credit to the actions of Connecticut courts. There is a very good chance that a Connecticut judgment based on this provision of the long-arm statute would not be honored by Canadian courts. (fn11) A Canadian court might require the action to be re-litigated or refuse to hear the case at all.
A person owning land damaged by pollution may be unable to find any of the polluter's assets where the land is located. Under present law, any judgment the injured party obtains in his home state may be unenforceable in the polluter's state because of jurisdictional problems. The polluter's
home courts might not entertain an action because the harm was not done to land situated within their state. The end result is that a polluter may act with impunity and not suffer the consequences of his actions. This result defies common sense and moral justice. This Act was designed to eliminate this "Catch22."
The Act allows a suit to be brought in a reciprocating jurisdiction where the pollution originates. A "reciprocating jurisdiction" is one that has enacted the Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act or "provides substantially equivalent access to its courts and administrative agencies." (fn12) At this writing, the Act has been adopted in at least Colorado, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Wisconsin, Ontario, Manitoba and Prince Edward Island; we are not aware of any efforts to show that the access provided by other jurisdictions is "substantially equivalent."
The Act specifies that Connecticut courts are to use their own rules, excluding choice of law rules, to determine what constitutes pollution, whether there is a sovereign immunity defense and most other points.
III. UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS.
The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification by the United States of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (fn13) in early 1992, subject to five reservations, five understandings, four declarations and a proviso. (fn14) Senator Bricker's ghost must have smiled when the United States became a party to the Covenant on June 8, 1992.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Covenant on December 16, 1966. It came into force on March 23, 1976, upon having been ratified or acceded to by 35 countries. Since that time, one hundred countries have become parties. The Covenant is universally recognized as setting important worldwide standards in the areas of procedural due process and human rights. For the most part, its provisions roughly correspond to the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional and statutory protections of civil and political rights in the federal and state law
of the United States.
The United States played a leading role in the development of the United Nations human rights treaties but has been extremely slow to ratify them. (fn15) This reluctance is not merely a matter of ignorant hostility to international law, although that has played a role; rather, there are some real difficulties in some of their provisions. The most serious concern is that some of the treaties require parties to outlaw speech that is constitutionally protected in the United States. For example, Article 20 of the Covenant provides:
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
Sentence 2 might be saved by the "incitement" qualification, but only if "discrimination" and "hostility," which are far too broad could be ignored. Sentence 1 is hopeless: even if we declined to prosecute the newspapers and editors who supported the next Operation Desert Storm, perhaps on the ground that an action supported by the Security Council is not "war," we could not refuse to prosecute the newspapers and editors who supported the next Vietnam "conflict" and leave that sentence any substance at all.
This sort of provision should not be in the Covenant at all. Only the most benighted cultural relativist can maintain that the governments of other countries should have the right to punish their citizens for peacefully expressing their views on political matters and it is difficult to imagine how such a position could be reconciled with support for the rest of the Covenant.
As one of us has always maintained, (fn16) the United States should be leading a movement to get this and the similar provisions of other human rights treaties changed. Thus, even though the reservation proposed by the Bush Administration and accepted by the Senate merely protects our law, (fn17) it was pleasant to find this sentence in the Senate Executive Report:
Ratification of the Covenant will allow the United States to seek revisions in Articles 19 and 20 and to help ensure that the limitations permitted under
these articles are interpreted narrowly.
Some form of reservation on this point was essential. We would have preferred a reservation to the effect that no other country should be outlawing political speech either, (fn18) but we can understand the preference for working for change from within rather than confrontation. However, it is important to distinguish between two sorts of reservations to treaties: the first seeks to preserve something important in our system from harm that might be caused by the treaty, while the second seeks to prevent the treaty from changing our law at all. The second can reduce our ratification to a symbolic act, if even that. Consider, for example, the third United States reservation to the Covenant:
That the United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
This is not disingenuous: the Bush Administration's explanation of this reservation states that it is based on disagreement with the Human Rights Committee established by the Covenant (and with the European Court of Human Rights) as to whether prolonged judicial proceedings in cases involving capital punishment, corporal punishment and solitary confinement can be considered human rights violations. (fn19)
However, the first declaration is:
That the United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27
of the Covenant are not self-executing.
Both the Bush Administration and the Foreign Relations Committee stated clearly that no implementing legislation was contemplated. There is an optional protocol to the Covenant, (fn20) which gives individuals the right to complain to the Human Rights Committee that a party to the Covenant is not fulfilling its obligations (fn21) but the protocol has not been submitted to the Senate for its advice, and consent. The result is that the Covenant will be enforceable by individuals neither in state or federal courts in the United States (fn22) nor in the Human Rights Committee, although its provisions are international obligations of the government of the United States.
The Covenant is divided into six parts. Part One (Article 1) deals with the right of self determination. It is widely recognized that all peoples have the right of self determination. (fn23) There is sometimes a practical difficulty in determining what constitutes "a people." This right allows a people to pursue its political, economic and cultural aspirations. (fn24) This is achieved, in part, through control of its natural wealth and resources. (fn25) Without the means of supporting itself, the promise of self determination is hollow. Therefore, the people may not be deprived of the means of its own subsistence in the guise of the right of self determination.
Part Two (Articles 2-5) deals generally with the equal protection of the law. Parties to the Covenant may not discriminate against individuals (not just citizens) on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (fn26) "Other status" is to be read broadly in this context and the Covenant requires that effective remedies be given to protect these rights.' Recognizing this, the Administration proposed and the Senate accepted an understanding that virtually reads "other status" out of the Covenant.
In times of a declared public emergency that "threatens the life of the nation," state parties may derogate from this principle of equal protection "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin." (fn28) Because any country must notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it is experiencing a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation (fn29) before derogating from any of the Covenant's rights, it is very unlikely this provision will be used frequently or for long periods of time. No country will want to admit to being in a chronic or frequent state of emergency. The Administration proposed and the Senate accepted an understanding that this provision does not bar, in public emergency situations, "distinctions that may have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status."
In Part Three (Articles 6-27), the Covenant provides that no country may arbitrarily impose the death penalty, (fn30) subject people to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, (fn31) hold people in slavery or servitude, (fn32) imprison people solely because of their inability to fulfill a contractual obligation, (fn33) subject anyone to ex-post facto criminal laws, (fn34) deprive people of their legal personality (fn35) or deprive people of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. (fn36) These are imperative civil and political rights, from which countries may not derogate, even in times of public emergency. Considering them too restrictive, the Administration proposed and the Senate accepted a reservation permitting capital punishment for crimes committed by persons under eighteen years of age; (fn37) the above-mentioned reservation defining "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment"; a reservation rejecting the Covenant's rule that "[i]f, subsequent to the commission of the offense, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby"; (fn38) a reservation permitting juveniles to be treated as adults in the criminal justice system; and several understandings limiting our international obligations to provide compensation to victims of unlawful arrest or detention, to separate the merely accused from the convicted, to provide a criminal defendant his counsel of choice and to compel witnesses on his behalf to appear. One of the understandings treats the Covenant's prohibition of double jeopardy as applicable only within the same "governmental unit," thus permitting trial of the same defendant for the same crime in state and federal courts or the courts of two states. (fn39)
The Covenant allows capital punishment, (fn40) but restricts sentences of death to only the most serious crimes. A death penalty can be carried out only by court order and not by an executive or legislative order. (fn41) Despite the reservation mentioned above, the Connecticut law on capital punishment will have to be changed at least with respect to the minimum age: our law now allows children who have obtained the age of 14 years to be tried as adults for murder under some circumstances. (fn42) Similarly, Connecticut law Should be changed to prohibit any person from being put to death while pregnant.
Article 11 forbids imprisonment merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation. This article will not prevent a United States court from enforcing an order of specific performance, civil contempt or penal contempt with imprisonment when a person refuses to fulfill a contractual obligation it the person has the ability actually to perform the contractual obligation.
Part Four (Articles 28-45) establishes a Human Rights Committee consisting of 18 members. (fn43) All countries that are parties to the Covenant are required to submit annual reports to the Human Rights Committee. (fn44) The Committee must study the reports and submit its own report to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which may include general comments about countries fulfilling their obligations under the Covenant. (fn45)
In addition, a country may declare that it recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee to investigate complaints that it is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant (fn46) and the United States did so in one of the declarations. The complaint may be made only by other states that are parties to the Covenant. This is a very important method for bringing to the Committee's attention issues that may not be obvious from the self-policing reports. Regrettably, the Committee does not have a binding way to deal with a country that fails to fulfill its obligations under the Covenant. Such concerns are mediated by the Committee or a subset of the Committee called a conciliation commission. (fn47) The Committee and its conciliation commissions have no way to adjudicate the dispute authoritatively.
Part Five (Articles 46-47) provides that this Covenant does not derogate from the Charter of the United Nations or the constitutions of its specialized agencies and is not to be interpreted "as impairing the right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural resources." This last was deemed to require a declaration:
The United States declares that the right referred to in Article 47 may be exercised only in accordance with international law.
This sentence surely will seem as bizarre to readers in other countries as it does to Americans. It is difficult to believe that many will pursue it far enough to learn, as we did, that this wording is supposed "to emphasize the important, countervailing principle of international law requiring prompt, adequate and effective compensation in cases of expropriation or nationalization"! (fn48)
Part Six (Articles 48-53) consists of general housekeeping provisions, which set forth such details as who may become a party to the Covenant, the procedure for ratification, accession and when the Covenant enters into force.
A number of cases have discussed Connecticut's enactment of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. (fn49) The question is whether or not a judgment from a sister state is eligible for enforcement under the Act. Under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign judgments Act, (fn50) a "foreign" judgment from a sister state may not be enforced if it is obtained by a confession of judgment or by a default in appearance. (fn51) However, some attorneys have tried to enforce such judgments under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.
Two Connecticut courts recently have considered the issue. Judge Fuller suggested in The Bank of New York v. Cocozza (fn52) that a plaintiff seeking to enforce a New York judgment guaranteeing a corporate debt could rely upon the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. (fn53) While the actual question before Judge Fuller was whether or not to allow a prejudgment remedy, he stated in dicta that the Bank of New York could rely on the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act in addition to being able to sue on the judgment at common law. There was no discussion of whether or not New York was a foreign state.
Judge Lewis commented in Hilton International of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Pacific (fn54) that a judgment rendered in Puerto Rico could not be enforced under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act because Puerto Rico is not a "foreign state" as defined in Connecticut General Statutes Section 50a-31(l). (fn55) Judge Lewis probably relied upon the prefatory note of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which indicates that the Act was intended to codify the law on recognition of judgments from foreign countries.
There is nothing in the Connecticut legislative history indicating the Uniform Foreign Money-judgments Recognition Act was intended to apply to the judgments of sister states, which are entitled to the full faith and credit under the United States Constitution. The authors respectfully submit that the holding when the issue was squarely addressed in Hilton International is the correct decision. (fn56)
A judgment creditor can always institute an independent action based upon a foreign judgment. (fn57) Because of the recent changes in Practice Book § 379, summary judgments can be filed at any time before the matter is placed on the trial list, even if the pleadings are not closed. Therefore, a
motion for summary judgment should either come with the initial complaint or be filed with the court shortly after the complaint is served. This should minimize the amount of time required to enforce foreign judgments in Connecticut. We hope that the traditional reticence of Superior Court judges in granting motions for summary judgment will be tempered by the fact this is an action on a judgment instead of a regular civil action.
Connecticut is gaining experience with its recently enacted international legislation. As the Bar and the Bench obtain familiarity with these new acts, a significant body of case law will develop to guide the practitioner.
*. Of the Meriden Bar; former Chair, Section of International Law and World Peace.
**. Vice President and Deputy General Counsel, Equator Holdings Limited, Hartford.
1. The only explicitly international article in the Connecticut Lawyer this year was Wilmarth, The New World of Export Controls, 3 Conn. Law., No. 1, at 8 SS t. 1992). In January 1993, the Section of International Law and World Peace an FIBA-CLE presented a program on "Representing Foreign-Owned Businesses in Connecticut." Audio tapes and extensive printed materials are available from CBA-CLE. The printed materials include Recknagel, Issues of Culture; Burkard, Foreign Direct Investments: Restrictions and Reporting Requirements- Schroth & McClancy, Liability and Control; Spier, Finance; Arvidson, Connecticut and Federal Taxation; Turrentine, Relations With Management; Zandy & Levesque, Foreign Enterprises Doing Business in Connecticut: Beware of Federal and State Employment Laws; Morrison & Swaine, Business Employment of Aliens Under U.S. Immigration Laws; and Gruen, Taxation of Foreign Executives.
2. See Lowry & Schroth, Survey of 1990 Developments in International Law in Connecticut, 65 CONN. B.J. 70, 70-71 (1991) (hereinafter "1990 Survey"), and Lowry & Schroth, Survey of 1991 Developments in International Law in Connecticut, 66 CONN. B.J. 64, 75-78 (1992) (hereinafter "1991 Survey").
3. See 1990 Survey, note 2 supra, at 71 and Part IV infra.
4. See 1991 Survey, note 2 supra, at 71.
5. See 1990 Survey, note 2 supra, at 71-72 and 1991 Survey, note 2 supra, at 74.
6. See 1991 Survey, note 2 supra, at 74-75.
7. This is the "1991 Omnibus Act" discussed in 1991 Survey, note 2 supra, at 65-75.
8. Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act, P.A. 92-109, codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-351b.
9. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b permits Connecticut courts to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident who commits a tortious act outside the State of Connecticut causing injury to a person or property within the State of Connecticut who
(A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in an other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives
substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce ....
10. See Ashai Metal Industry Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano
County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980). The Connecticut long arm statute probably would be interpreted as
conferring the maximum amount of jurisdiction allowed by the United States
Constitution. See WorldWide at 290.
11. English courts have ruled they have no jurisdiction to try a damage action for ass to land situated abroad, British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mozambique, 8s 3] AC 602. This rule is generally followed to the extreme in Canada. See generally Recognition and Enforcement of United States Judgments in Canadian Common Law Provinces: The Problem of In Personam Jurisdiction, 15 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 317 (1989).
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-351b(b)(1).
13. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) of Dec. 16,1966, 21 GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
14. U.S. Senate Executive Report 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reproduced at 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992). The reservations, declarations and understandings were proposed by the Bush Administration (to a large extent following or approximating those proposed by the Carter Administration), but the proviso was proposed by Senator Helms and adopted by the Senate on the basis that it's not be included in the instrument of ratification to be deposited by the President." It reads, "Nothing in this Covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.
15. The Covenant was transmitted promptly on February 23, 1978, by President Carter to the Senate, which held hearings in November 1979. As the Senate Executive Report puts it, "Domestic and international events at the end of 1979, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran, prevented the Committee [on Foreign Relations] from moving to a vote on the Covenant. The Reagan Administration did not indicate any interest in ratifying the Covenant." Senate Executive Report, note 14 supra, at 2, 31 I.L.M. at 649. Thus the Covenant was not considered further until President Bush so requested, in a letter to the Chairman of the Committee dated August 8,1991.
An excellent introduction to this general area is Roundtable, The United States Constitution and the Adoption of International Human Rights Instruments: Freeing the Political Logjam, 20 GA. J. INT'L &Comp. L. 253-488 (1990).
16. See Schroth & Mueller, Racial Discrimination: The United States and the International Convention, 4 HUMAN Rights 171 (1975).
17. "That Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States."
18. Unfortunately, it appears that some countries that might not otherwise have done so are enacting laws prohibiting and penalizing "incitement to racial discrimination" or imposing sanctions for "improper publicity," citing their obligations under the Covenant. Cohn, The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the Human Rights Committee and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 13 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 295, 310-311 (1991).
19. Senate Executive Report, note 14 supra, at 12, 31 I.L.M. at 654.
20. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) of Dec. 16,1966,21 GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
21. Protocol Article 1. There is no nationality requirement to make a complaint, so apparently both aliens and citizens may do so. While the protocol gives the Committee the authority to investigate such complaints directly instead of waiting for a complaint by another country, the Committee still has no authority to adjudicate such disputes.
22. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,194 (ISM).
23. Article 1(1).
24. These as rations suggest some of the criteria for defining "a people."
25. Article 1(2).
26. Article 2(1).
27. Article 2(2).
28. Article 4(1). This is in accord with general principles of international law concerning the treatment of enemy aliens during times of war and similar situations.
29. Article 4(3).
30. Article 6.
31. Article 7.
32. Articles 8(1) and 8(2).
33. Article 11.
34. Article 15.
35. Article 16.
36. Article 18.
37. See Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), allowing execution of defendants aged 16 and 17 when the crimes were committed. Compare Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), prohibiting execution of a defendant aged 15 when the crime was committed.
38. Article 15(1).
39. See Burton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
40. Article 6(2).
41. Article 6(2).
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. §46b-127(l). Capital felonies are defined by CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-54b and the procedure for imposing the death penalty is codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-46a.
43. Article 28(1).
44. Article 40(1).
45. Article 40(4).
46. Article 41.
47. Article 42.
48. Senate Executive Report, note 14 supra, at 20, 31 I.L.M. at M
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§50a-30 et seq.
50. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§52-604 et seq.
51. Connecticut's version of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign judgments Act does not allow the enforcement of judgments obtained by a default in appearance or by a confession of judgment. It differs in this respect from the Uniform Act as promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which would allow enforcement of such judgments.
52. 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2465 (Oct. 22, 1991).
53. judge Fuller agreed with Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Nielson, 1991 WL 85151 (Conn. Super. May 8,1991), without citing it. Fairfield explicitly held that New York is a foreign state within the meaning Of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 50a-31(l). judge Dorsey also seemed to suggest Massachusetts was a foreign state in LeaseComm. Corp. v. Forrest, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2990 (Oct. 14,1992).
54. 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 882 n. 2 (March 19,1992).
55. This section provides: " 'Foreign state' means any governmental unit other than the United States or any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof."
56. Part of the problem may be that the names of the two acts are confusingly similar.
57. Seaboard Surety v. Waterbury, 38 Conn. Sup. 468, 470 (1982).